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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78A-3-102(3XJ)(2009). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issues on appeal are: 
1. Whether the doctrine of equitable adoption is fundamentally flawed and should be 
overruled by the Supreme Court. Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 
461, 464 (Utah 1996) (citations omitted). 
2. Whether the doctrine of equitable adoption has been effectively overruled by 
subsequent statutory enactments in the Utah Uniform Probate Code and the Utah 
Adoption Act. Because this issue concerns the interpretation of the relevant 
statutes, the standard of review is correction of error. Parks v. Utah Transit Auth., 
2002 UT 55, % 53P.3d473. 
3. Whether the doctrine of equitable adoption has been overruled by a subsequent 
Supreme Court decision. Because this issue concerns the "effect of a prior judicial 
decision,'' the standard of review is correction of error. Billings v. Union Bankers 
Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 464 (Utah 1996) (citations omitted). 
4. Whether the trial court's findings of fact support its legal conclusion that Father 
William J. Hannifin agreed with Willis Nakai's parents, Hilda Nakai and Tony 
Begay, to adopt Mr. Nakai. In re Williams' Estates, 10 Utah 2d 83, 348 P.2d 683 
-vii-
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(Utah 1960). Because Mr. Hill is not challenging the trial court's findings of fact, 
the issue of whether a contract exists is an issue of law and the standard of review 
is correction of error. O'Hara v. Hall, 628 P.2d 1289, 1290-91 (Utah 1981). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. §75-1-102 (1975), Purposes - Rule of construction. 
(1) This code shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes 
and policies. 
(2) The underlying purposes and policies of this code are: 
(a) To simplify and clarify the law concerning the affairs of decedents, missing 
persons, protected persons, minors, and incapacitated persons; 
(b) To discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in distribution of 
his property; 
(c) To promote a speedy and efficient system for administering the estate of the 
decedent and making distribution to his successors; 
(d) To facilitate use and enforcement of certain trusts; and 
(e) To make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions. 
Utah Code Ann. §75-1-201 (3) (1975). General Definitions. 
(3) "Child" includes any individual entitled to take as a child under this code by intestate 
succession from the parent whose relationship is involved and excludes any person who is 
only a stepchild, a foster child, a grandchild, or any more remote descendant. 
Utah Code Ann. §75-1-201 (21) (1975). General Definitions. 
(21) "Issue" of an individual means all of his lineal descendants of all generations, with 
the relationship of parent and child at each generation being determined by the definition 
of child and parent contained in this title. 
-viii-
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Utah Code Inn «,; «> I  Jill II i .*) I III1 I I .n irr i i l I IHI I I I IKI us. 
(28) "Parent" includes an\ person entitled to take, or w 110 would be entitled to take if the 
child died w iilnmi a w ill. as a parent under (his code by intestate succession from the 
child whose relationship K in que -non and excludes any person, who is 01 lly a stepparent, 
foster parent, or grandparent. 
Iiliiiii! i ui\v \ im. i (7S-2 11M> i i'• *'"( "^ ili 111 iiii iii'iii s illiiiill il HI i i mi i i in. i i i i i i i ^ ' i | i i n i 
(1) Ihe part of the intestate estate not passing to the >ui •> t\ ing spouse under Sec; ion 
75-2-102, or the entire intestate estate if there is no surviving spouse, passes as follows: 
(a) To the issue <>f die decedent by representation. 
(b) If there is no surviving issue, u^ bis purer! or parents equally. 
(c) If there is no s u\ iving issue or pareni n {,,e i^ue of the parents or en; * 
of them by representation. 
(d) If there is no surviving issi^. parent, or l^uc ol a pau.nL ^w\ ilk ueceuem is 
survived by one or more grandparents or issue of grandparents, half lo the estate passes lo 
the paternal grandparents if both survive, or to the sur\ iving paternal grandparent, oi ;o 
the issue of paternal grandparents if both are deceased, the issue taking by representation; 
and the other half passes to the maternal relatives in ilk ame manner; but if there be no 
sur\ i\ ing grandparent or issue of grandparent on cubci the paternal or maternal side, the 
mn*v estate passes to the relatives on the other side in the same manner as the half 
<V^  If there is no surviving issue, parent or issue of a parent, grandparent. * n 
issue ol a grandparent, then the entire estate passes to the next of kin in equal degree 
excepting that when there are two or more collateral relatives in equal decree, but 
claiming through different ancestors, those who claim through the nearest ancestor must 
be preferred to those claiming through an ancestor more remote. 
Utah Code Ann. §75-2-109(1"! (\cr5). Meaning of Child and Related Terms. 
(1) li. ior purposes ol miesiaic sucec -.MOM .i i c u l i n M u p o t p u u - -e 
(a) An adopted person is die ehnu >u \\w adopting parent, and not of the natural 
parent, except that adoption of a child h\ the spouse ol a natural parent has no clTccl on 
ilk relationship between the child and the natural parent. 
case*; not coven, d iw subsection (l)(a), a person born out of wedlock is a 
(. •.. • -i ;ne mnilk-r That person is also a child of the father, if: 
i: ;: 
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(i) The natural parents participated in a marriage ceremony before or after the 
birth of the child, even though the attempted marriage is void; or 
(ii) The paternity is established by an adjudication before the death of the father 
or is established thereafter by clear and convincing proof, except that the paternity 
established under this subsection (l)(b)(ii) is ineffective to qualify the father or his 
kindred to inherit from or through the child unless the father has openly treated the child 
as his and has not refused to support the child. 
Utah Code Ann. §75-2-701 (1975), Contracts concerning succession. 
A contract to make a will or devise, or not to revoke a will or devise, or to die intestate, if 
executed after the effective date of this part, can be established only by provisions of a 
will stating material provisions of the contract; an express reference in a will to a contract 
and extrinsic evidence proving the terms of the contract; or a writing signed by the 
decedent evidencing the contract. The execution of a joint will or mutual wills does not 
create a presumption of a contract not to revoke the will or wills. 
Utah Code Ann. §75-3-718 (1992). Compensation of personal representative and 
attorney. 
(1) A personal representative and an attorney are entitled to reasonable compensation for 
their services. If a petition is filed which either directly or indirectly seeks approval of the 
personal representative's compensation or the attorney's compensation and if no 
objection is filed by an interested person to the compensation requested, reasonable 
compensation shall be the compensation sought in the petition. When an interested person 
objects to the personal representative's compensation, the court shall determine 
reasonable compensation for the personal representative based on the quality, quantity, 
and value of the services rendered to the estate and the circumstances under which those 
services were rendered, including the practice for other fiduciaries who are in similar 
circumstances to the personal representative in question. When an interested person 
objects to the attorney's compensation, the court shall determine reasonable compensation 
for the attorney based on rules adopted by the Judicial Council. 
(2) When a petition seeks approval of or objects to a personal representative's 
compensation or an attorney's compensation, at least 10 days before the time set for the 
hearing of the petition, the petitioner or the petitioner's attorney shall send a copy of the 
petition to all interested persons either by certified, registered, or first class mail or by 
hand-delivery. 
1 
-x-
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(.>) i I a v\iil pn'\ iuc.-> U)i; cwinpcn.-valioh ui I = IL personal lcpiesentativc and there ; va-
contract with the decedent regarding compensation, the personal representative ma\ 
renounce the provision before qualifying and be entitled to reasonable compensatioi 
personal representalh e also nia\ renomu ,i hi-- right to ; !' -** any part of the compensation, 
A written renunciation of fee ma> he lilol ^ ilh ilie conn 
• . • ' • . SI UiiM\iI'l H o r I III '1 ' iMI' 
L Tiir Ml in I ill i" „ of flic < 'iise. 
Willis Nakai claimed to be the sole beneficiary of the estate of lather William J 
Hannifin as Father Tlannifiii's equitabh adopted SOIL Max Hill. Father Uanniln 's first 
cousin, acting as special administrator <- . ^ 
nineteei i collateral i elative: >sed 1\ •!• - •- claii i i asset tii • * ." tne comn ion law 
doctrine of equitable adoptioii had been overturned by subsequent legislation and 
Supreme Court decisions, and that, in am e\ cut, Mr. Nakai w as nr-t entitled to the 
application i-l HK <.quii.il"->e adoption doctrine i 11 idet Lt it: facts of tl i.e case As pan I: of the 
proceeding ' :>f' ai 1 a v 'ai d of attoi i leys fees ai id I\ lax I till opposed 
each application. 
2. Course of Proceedings. 
Oi iMaj -(). JIOIU. Appellee. Willis NJILIL tiled his u ' l i ha l \pp Ilea lion ilui 
Informal Appoinlmenl its Pi. isoniil \i\ pn Miil-iln e uftlu hstale of VVilliain Hannifin. 
R.l-20. Mr. Nakai identified his interest in the estate as the decedent's "foster son v R ...2, 
1|5 Ile represented that the decedent, an Episcopal Priest, died without a spouse, 
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children, parents, brothers, sisters, or heirs, "other than Mr. Nakai" and his family. R.l, 
1f1fl53,4;R.2,1f9. 
On July 30, 2010, the Court entered an "Order1 of Appointment of Personal 
Representative." R.29-30. Thereafter, on August 4, 2010, one of the Father Hannifm's 
fellow priests in the Episcopal Church, the Reverend Canon Caryl Marsh, acting on 
behalf of some of Father Hannifin's collateral relatives and believing that Mr. Nakai was 
not entitled to Father Hannifin's estate as his "heir," filed an ex parte motion for a 
restraining order. R.35-39. On August 6, the trial court entered its "Ex Parte Temporary 
Restraining Order and Order to Vacate Appointment and Letters." R.41-44. Although 
entitled an "Order to Vacate Appointment," in the Order the trial court modified the text 
and "stayed" rather than "vacated" the order of appointment. R.42. After additional 
pleadings and hearings, the trial court eventually entered its Order on September 27, 2010 
in which it continued Mr. Nakai's appointment as personal representative "for the sole 
purpose of gathering assets and paying outstanding bills." 
On December 28, 2010, Max Hill, filed his "Petition for Order: (i) Appointing 
Max Hill Special Administrator with Limited Duties; (ii) Approving Heirs Private 
Agreement for Distribution of Estate; (iii) for Approval of Contingent Fee Agreement; 
1
 The Court should have entered a "Statement" of Informal Appointment. 
Compare Utah Code Ann. §75-3-301 et al (procedures governing informal applications 
for probate) with Utah Code Ann. §75-3-401 et al (procedures governing formal petitions 
for probate). 
-xii-
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the Special Administrator of the estate with the limited duty and pow er to represent 
Father Ilannifin's nineteen collateral relatives in litigation contesting Mr. Nakai's claim 
to the estate, R v. * > . , . . . ; .; ,i;ccL^lui .; ^AII.W, a pp . :.\u • .:\u .: - e i - 1 
Represei itati1 /e of the Estate. R 320 , [^20 
On January i9. 201 i, the Court entered its order granting the relief sought in Mr. 
Hill's petition (R.381-86), and Letters of Special Administration wax issued. R 388-89. 
OnMarch4. ..-..,. u,-* • ^  ur>i Application .v ,;; ;iev 
Costs as Personal • :-*.*•-.•' * •-' Wi 111"" Mi 
"Response in Opposition io vV iiliam Nakai's Applicatioii for Attornex 1 ces." R.400 ;4. 
On Juh 21= 201 ]. die Court, the Honorable Robert T Milder presiding, held a 
bene >\ inal regarding IV;• <,.k.u > dam; - aieritance as an equitably adopteu . - and 
h i s • i •• ! t ! r ,^s. 
3. Trial Com t Decision. 
On Juh 27. 201 I. die uiai court eiitered its "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of! w\ 
R u l l i i L ! a n d 0 | * i , , i K . ' M » H M 'W ; : : , ! ; , M ; ] v l C l l i C l L ' M ' : , , , -iUK i . . . \-.i 
Prior to trial, Mr. Nakai supplemented his appi^atau. K.-tau-b/. iVir. . mi 
addressed the supplement lo Mr. Nakai's applicaticM :" his ^:i\] K-:ef P 518 ^". 
" I'he tnal court orally denied Mr. 1 lilTs claim uurinu the course of the trial, but 
the ii ml court did no! include that denial as pan ot" IK U : Miu r..!in^ 
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Williams' Estates, 10 Utah 2d 83, 348 P.2d 683 (Utah 1960). It held that Mr. Nakai was 
entitled to be treated as Father Hannifin's equitably adopted son, declared him to be the 
sole beneficiary of Father Hannifin's estate, and granted him attorney fees (payable from 
the estate). R.577-79. Thereafter, on August 1, 2011, the trial court entered its "Ruling 
and Order Attorney Fees" expanding on its reasoning for awarding attorney fees to Mr. 
Nakai. R.583-85. 
4. Post Trial Proceedings. 
On August 4, 2011, Max Hill filed his "Motion for a New Trial Asking the Court 
to Amend the Court's July 27, 2011 Ruling Based on an Error of Law." R.586-589. The 
trial court entered its Order denying Mr. Hill's Motion on December 15, 2011. R.722-28. 
Mr. Hill filed his Notice of Appeal on December 29, 2011. R.729. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
William J. Hannifin was born August 3, 1930; he became a Priest in the Episcopal 
Church prior to the events described below and remained so until his death. He never 
married and had no children. See generally Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Ruling 
and Order, dated July 27, 2011 (the "Findings"), R.566-581; 566, f 1. Father Hannifin 
spent much of his life helping Native American people, including Navajos. Findings, 
R.567,t3. 
Willis Nakai was born May 13, 1944, to Navajo parents, Hilda Nakai and Tony 
Begay, and was at all times a member of the Navajo Tribe. Findings R.566, [^2; 567, | 4 . 
-xiv-
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Hilda ai id 1 01 ly rei i laii ledi i lai i ied i n it • ^ M " first 
met Mr. Nakai around 1956, when Mr. Nakai was 12 years old after Mr. Nakai enrolled in 
the Intermountain Indian Schcx >1 ii 1 Brigham City, I Itah ("IIS") Findings, R.567, *p. 
The trial court found that Mi Nakai was raised ft oi i I ii lfancy by 1 lis c 1 lildless ai u it 
until 1 ler tragic deatl i" \ 1 lei 11 le vv as five oi six years < JM "I lltl IOI igl i I n iiiei c ustody o i 1 ii •> 
mother Hilda and his maternal grandparents , Mr. Nakai was thereafter sent to a series of 
boarding schools, including IIS in Brigham H h . As a K -nil Mi NTakai pent \ e i y litlle 
t ime actually residing with either 1lis parents or his grandparents , f ind ings , *. 
In 1 hi • -iiinnuM' ol IM'SK 1 iillhi'i 1 liiiiiii I mi mi 1111 \ r Ii i llic t • '•' v- • -s - r 
Aneth , Utah, to transport several children to attend Camp Futile, a youth camp near Salt 
I ,ake City sponsored by the Episcopal Church. * V \ T a l i: A as among these childreii At 
the t ime of the . i*. *.iv n..»i * - ui ;* i.n* . ,. ,. ..iU.. .. w n u w n u, .. »her 
a * i * - oi iv • •as 
alive, marr ied lo, and living with Hilda, Lh^ trial U J U U k/Uiid dial I on) ' wdb no; very 
involved in the family" and was "frequently away from h o m e . " ItI 
During tl le visit, I :ather Hannifin :.,..,: a conversation with I lilda and I"\ It I iakai ' s 
n laternal grai ldfatl lei "1\ Ii Naka i ' s fatl lei \ \/a...s. i not a p a i ty to tl le coi lversation Fall ler 
Hannif in had difficult) understanding Navajo and Hilda and her father had difficulty 
understanding English. Findings, R.568, ^[9. Nonetheless , this discussion forms the 
foui idation of I\ Ir. 1 Jakai' s claim,, 
x1 ' 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Based on stories told to Mr. Nakai by his parents, grandparents, and Father 
Hannifin, the trial court found that the gist of the conversation was as follows: 
Mr. Nakai's mother asked Father Hannifin to take her then 14-year-old son 
and raise him as his own child... . Father Hannifin responded "No, unless 
you take me as one of your children, as one of your relatives, that's the only 
way I'm going to take your son." Mr. Nakai's grandfather then jokingly 
offered "to sell him to [Father Hannifin] for fifty cents." Findings, R.568-
69, t i l . 
Mr. Nakai did not immediately return to Brigham City. But sometime later he 
returned and continued his education at IIS. Findings, R.569, |13. 
Mr. Nakai's relationship with Father Hannifin evolved over time. Findings, R.570, 
^[15. Initially, he lived at the boarding school and only spent holidays and weekends with 
Father Hannifin. Later, Mr. Nakai experienced some health problems while attending IIS, 
and Mr. Nakai thereafter began living in Father Hannifin's home. He continued to live 
there the remainder of his time at IIS and while attending Utah State. Id. He stopped 
living with Father Hannifin after January 25, 1969 when he married his wife. R.9. 
While attending IIS, the Bureau of Indian Affairs paid all of Mr. Nakai's tuition, 
books, and boarding expenses. The trial court found that following his serious illness, 
"throughout all the remaining years of Mr. Nakai's minority and even subsequently, 
Father Hannifin provided an allowance, food, clothing, medical care as necessary and 
transportation." Findings, R.570-71, ]fl6. 
The trial court found: 
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Commencing with Mr. Nakai's return to Brigham City after the summer of 
1958, Father Hannifin consistently provided emotional and material support 
as a father would for a son. Father Hannifin also taught Mr. Nakai to drive, 
monitored his schoolwork, [and] Father Hannifin commenced his lifelong 
involvement with [Mr. Nakai] in what . . . was clearly a parental role 
Id 
The trial court further found that: 
From the time that Mr. Nakai returned to [IIS apparently in 1958] and 
commenced his life with Father Hannifin, he referred to Father Hannifin as 
his father, or "dad" and Father Hannifin referred to Mr. Nakai as his son. 
Findings, R.571417. 
Although Mr. Hill is not challenging this finding, the record reveals the following trial 
court findings and other unrebutted facts that are important to Mr. Hill's argument in 
Section I below: 
1. Father Hannifin's obituary described Mr. Nakai as Father Hannifin's 
foster son. T.Exh. 105, Findings, R.572, «p0. 
2. Father Hannifin's obituary identified another Native American as another 
foster son. Id. 
3. Mr. Nakai sent thank you notes following Father Hannifin's funeral that 
stated: "Thank you for all the kindnesses, thoughts and prayers expressed 
for my foster father William Hannifin . . . " T.Exh. 103. 
4. Mr. Nakai described himself in his initial petition to the Court as Father 
Hannifin's "foster son." T.Exh. 101 at 2, ^5; R.2 TJ5. 
5. In 2007, Father Hannifin prepared and signed a beneficiary form leaving his 
Wells Fargo Investment Account to Mr. Nakai as his "foster son." T. Exh. 
111. 
Although the trial court noted "there is a lack of evidence of formal recognition of 
the father-son relationship," it nonetheless found: 
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[F]rom. the time Mr. Nakai returned to the school [in 1958], he never again 
lived with either his parents or grandparents. . . . Mr. Nakai visited the 
Reservation and his biological family no more than once each year and 
visited lasted a few days to at most two weeks, but was typically for a week. 
. . . [FJfollowing Mr. Nakai's return to Brigham City after the summer of 
1958, both he and Father Hannifin held themselves out to the community 
and to family as father and son. Over the many following years, Father 
Hannifin assumed the role of and actively participated as a father to Mr. 
Nakai and later as a grandfather to Mr. Nakai's children. The record is 
replete with evidence that Father Hannifin was involved with Mr. Nakai 
and his family as a respected father, grandfather and even great-grandfather. 
Mr. Nakai continued to seek counsel from Father Hannifin as a parent and 
Father Hannifin gave that counsel over the decades... . The Court can and 
does determine that Mr. Nakai and Father Hannifin saw them as living in a 
father and son relationship and Father Hannifin assumed all of the duties 
and responsibilities of a parent. Findings, R.571-72, t1fl9, 21. 
In addressing the issue of whether the Mr. Nakai's parents promised to surrender 
all of their parental rights to Father Hannifin, the trial court identified four facts that it 
found controlling: 
1. Hilda and her father asked Father Hannifin to raise Mr. Nakai as his own 
child and then gave Father Hannifin custody and control of Mr. Nakai several 
months later. 
2. Neither Hilda, Mr. Nakai's father, nor Hilda's father thereafter ever again 
sought to exercise physical custody or control over Mr. Nakai. 
3. Mr. Nakai never lived with his parents for any extended period. After the 
death of his aunt, he attended boarding schools. 
4. Because of their impoverished conditions, Mr. Nakai's parents provided 
him with virtually no support after he left the reservation. The trial court noted 
that the financial condition on the reservation appeared to be the primary reason 
for asking Father Hannifin to raise Mr. Nakai. Findings, R.573-74, f24. 
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Acknowledging that "there was no formal relinquishment here" and that "Navajo 
parents never voluntarily relinquish their rights to their children," the trial court 
nonetheless relied upon Navajo customs to find that there was "for all practical purposes 
a relinquishment of parental rights" Findings, R. 575, ^ |26; R. 576,1J27. In justification 
for this position, the trial court noted: "The Court does not require proof that a formal 
relinquishment occur, otherwise there would likely be a formal adoption." Findings, 
R.575,f26. 
Regarding Mr. Nakai's father, Tony, the trial court held that neither a promise to 
relinquish nor a practical relinquishment were necessary for him. It did so based on its 
findings that: 
1. Tony never participated actively in his son's life; 
2. Navajo custom follows a matriarchal order; 
3. Although present during the 1958 conversation, Tony made no effort to 
participate in the conversation; 
4. Tony never objected to Mr. Nakai living with Father Hannifin; and 
5. There was no evidence Tony expected to be involved in the decision. 
R.576,TJ30. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The equitable adoption doctrine is fundamentally flawed and should be overruled. 
The enactment of the Utah Uniform Probate Code in 1975 effectively overruled 
the common law equitable adoption doctrine. 
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The enactment of specific adoption statutes after 1960 effectively overruled the 
common law equitable adoption doctrine. 
The Supreme Court's 1981 decision in Hills v. Hills, 638 P.2d 516 (1981), 
effectively overruled the common law equitable adoption doctrine. 
In applying the facts it found to the law, the trial court erroneously concluded that 
Father Hannifin and Mr. Nakai's parents had entered into a binding contract for Father 
Hannifin to adopt Mr. Nakai that could be specifically enforced on behalf of Mr. Nakai. 
-xx-
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ARGUMENT 
I. BECAUSE THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATION FOR THE EQUITABLE 
ADOPTION DOCTRINE IS FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED, THE 
SUPREME COURT SHOULD OVERRULE IN RE WILLIAMS' ESTATES 
IN ANY EVENT. 
A. The Equitable Foundation for the Equitable Adoption Doctrine in 
Utah. 
In Williams' Estates, the Utah Supreme Court found that a person could establish 
rights of inheritance based on the concept of equitable adoption. Because "equity regards 
as done what should have been done," the Supreme Court approved the doctrine for a 
putative adoptee by granting specific performance if there was a fully performed adoption 
contract (except for the formal adoption). In re Williams' Estate, 10 Utah 2d 83, 85, 348 
P.2d 683 (Utah 1960). 
B. The Foundational Basis of the Equitable Adoption Doctrine is Illogical. 
While more than half the states have accepted the Equitable Adoption Doctrine,4 
none of the decisions in favor of the doctrine have undertaken a careful analysis of the 
application of equitable principles to the transmission of property at death. See generally 
122 A.L.R. 5th 205, "Modern Status of Law as to Equitable Adoption or Adoption by 
Estoppel," (2004) updated weekly ("Modern Status"). Because children seeking 
inheritance rights are normally innocent of any wrongdoing, the courts have used 
equitable principles to find that the child was adopted for inheritance tax purposes. But 
4
 A significant minority of states have refused to adopt the doctrine. Id. 
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none of the adopting states have examined whether equity and justice have any role to 
play when it comes to determining any person's right to be a successor to a decedent's 
property. 
Utah law grants every resident the right to execute a will (or will substitute) that 
directs the distribution of that person's property. Utah Code Ann. §75-2-501 (1998). As 
the Model Utah Jury Instructions provide: 
RIGHT OF TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION 
Every person who is competent, over the age of 18 years, and not 
acting under [undue influence or fraud], has the right to make a will 
directing the disposition of that person's property upon death in any way 
that person sees fit. No one is required to make any disposition so that it 
will meet with the approval of a judge or jury or any other person. 
The right to dispose of property by will is a fundamental right 
assured by law and does not depend upon this right being wisely used. 
A will cannot be set aside solely because it may appear to you to be 
unreasonable or unjust; however, the naturalness or unnaturalness of the 
distribution provided for in the will is one fact you should consider in 
resolving the issues in this case. 
MUJI Rule 23.4. If a decedent chooses to exercise the right to prepare and execute a will, 
and if the decedent excludes a child, adopted child, foster child, or a child having a claim 
to equitable adoption, that right is protected and enforced regardless of how deserving 
and innocent the child might be. 
When a decedent chooses not to adopt a personal plan for the distribution of his or 
her properly, the decedent nonetheless chooses a default plan for the distribution of his or 
her property - the laws of intestate succession. Muldrow et al v. Caldwell et aL, 173 S.C. 
243, 175 S.E. 501 (S.C. 1934) ("The fact that he died without having executed a will must 
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be taken as a reasonable assumption that he was satisfied with the will the law of the state 
made for him, if he chose to die intestate.") The default plan represents the Legislature's 
decision as to how the average Utah resident would want to leave his or her property had 
that average person executed a will. By not executing a personal plan, the decedent 
chooses the government's plan. 
It is incongruous for a will to be valid even if "unjust and unreasonable/' while the 
Utah Legislature's determination of who would be an heir is subject to equitable 
adjustment based on equitable principles. Mr. Hill believes that the Court should reject 
equitable adoption as inconsistent with the laws of testate and intestate succession.^ 
But beyond this, the whole concept of equitable adoption is backwards. The 
majority of the adopting states have limited its use to intestacy. See generally, Modern 
Status; see Id., Sections 16[a] and 16[b]. If a putative parent violates a contract to adopt, 
equity should protect the putative child with regard to the parent's obligations to support 
and nurture the child. Adoption, which by its very nature is equitable, would be the 
natural place to apply, not exclude, the doctrine. Wilson v. Pierce, 14 Utah 2d 317, 318, 
383 P.2d 925 (Utah 1963). 
5
 Prior to 1998, an express statement in a will disinheriting an heir would not preclude 
the heir from inheriting any portion of the estate falling into intestacy. See Utah Code Ann. §75-
2-101(b) (1998) (permitting disinheritance of an heir's rights of inheritance). If ever there was a 
place for the application of principles of justice and equity in inheritance law, that would have 
been the place. But the rule was not replaced until the Legislature modified the intestacy statute. 
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Thus, even had the Legislature not overruled Williams' Estates, the Supreme Court 
should reject the doctrine as unsound and flawed. 
II. THE ADOPTION OF THE UTAH UNIFORM PROBATE CODE 
EFFECTIVELY OVERRULED THE EQUITABLE ADOPTION 
DOCTRINE. 
A. The Legislature Has Both the Right and the Responsibility to 
Determine the Extent of a Person's Right to Inherit in Intestacy. 
No one has a constitutional right to receive an intestate's property. As the United 
States Supreme Court stated in Irving Trust Co. v. Day: 
Rights of succession to the property of a deceased, whether by will or by 
intestacy, are of statutory creation, and the dead hand rules succession only 
by sufferance. Nothing in the Federal Constitution forbids the legislature of 
a state to limit, condition, or even abolish the power of testamentary 
disposition over property within its jurisdiction. 
314 U.S. 556, 562, 62 S.Ct. 398, 401, 86 L.Ed. 452 (U.S. 1942). When the legislature 
enacts laws governing inheritance and the determination of who is an heir at law, the 
courts should interpret those statutes to fulfill the legislative intent, regardless of whether 
the action creates, limits, or eliminates any particular person's inheritance rights. Kunz & 
Co. v. State, Dept. ofTransp, 949 P.2d 763, 767 (Utah App. 1997) (legislative province 
"to craft language of [Utah] statutes"); c.f., Maakv. IHC Health Services, Inc., 2007 UT 
App 244, f^29, 166 P.3d 631 ("Public policy is the province of the [legislature], not the 
[judiciary]." Indeed, in resolving issues involving intestacy, courts regularly refer to the 
decedent's heirs as "statutory heirs." Westlaw search using: "statutory heir" % wrongful 
/l death (where % means "but not"). Mr. Nakai is not a statutory heir. 
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While the majority of states have adopted the common law equitable adoption 
doctrine, none have done so in the context of the passage of the Uniform Probate Code, 
the adoption of specific adoption statutes, and a Supreme Court precedent, all after the 
adoption of the doctrine. See generally Modern Status. Those states that have declined to 
adopt the doctrine have done so based on the power of the legislature to determine 
intestate heirs. Id. at 3 [b]. 
By enacting the Utah Uniform Probate Code in 1975, the Utah Legislature created 
specific rules regarding the inheritance of property in Utah contrary to the Supreme 
Court's decision in Williams' Estate. Mr. Hill asks the Court to affirm the legislative 
power and duty to determine successors' rights to an intestate's assets by overruling 
Williams' Estate, reversing the trial court decision, and ordering distribution of the 
decedent's estate to the decedent's statutory heirs. 
B. Utah Law Limits Inheritance to Children Who Are Naturally Born or 
Formally Adopted. 
The part of the intestate estate not passing to the surviving spouse under 
Section 75-2-102, or the entire intestate estate if there is no surviving 
spouse, passes as follows: 
(a) to the issue of decedent;... 
Utah Code Ann. §75-2-103(l)(a) (1975).6 
6
 Amended by Laws 1998, c. 39, § 12, eff. July 1, 1998; Laws 2010, c. 93, § 6, eff. 
May 11, 2010; Laws 2010, c. 324, § 121, eff. May 11, 2010. 
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"Issue" of an individual means all of his lineal descendants of all 
generations, with the relationship of parent and child at each generation 
being determined by the definition of child and parent contained in this 
title. 
Utah Code Ann. §75-1-201(21) (1975); emphasis added.7 
C. The Direction on How to Determine Who Is a Child Overrules In re 
Williams' Estates. 
As enacted in 1975, Utah law expressly explained how a parent child relationship 
would be determined for purposes of intestate succession. 
If, for purposes of intestate succession, a relationship of parent and child 
must be established to determine succession by, through, or from a person: 
(a) An adopted person is the child of the adopting 
parent, and not of the natural parent, except that 
adoption of a child by the spouse of a natural parent 
has no effect on the relationship between the child and 
the natural parent. 
(b) [dealing with natural children born out of wedlock]. 
Utah Code Ann. §75-2-109(1) (1975);8 emphasis added. Thus, the only two methods of 
identifying a child "for purposes of intestate succession," were legal adoption and natural 
parentage. Note also that despite the legislatures intent that a child inherit from only the 
adopting parent, an equitably adopted child would inherit from either family. 
7
 Amended by Laws 1998, c. 39, § 9, eff. July 1, 1998; Laws 1999, c. 142, § 1, eff. 
May 3, 1999; Laws 2003, c. 49, § 34, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2004, c. 89, § 7, eff. July 1, 
2004; Laws 2009, c. 278, § 1, eff. May 12, 2009; Laws 2010, c. 93, § 3, eff. May 11, 
2010; substantive identical version of definition is now found in §75-1-201(9) and (25). 
8
 Repealed by Laws 1998, c. 39, § 17, eff. July 1, 1998; reenacted in substance as 
§75-2-114, Laws 1998, ch. 39, § 22.. 
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D. The Definition of "Child" Further Supports Mr. Hill's Position. 
"Child" includes any individual entitled to take as a child 
under this code by intestate succession from the parent whose 
relationship is involved and excludes any person who is only 
a stepchild, a foster child, a grandchild, or any more 
remote descendant. 
Utah Code Ann. §75-1-201(3) (1975);9 emphasis added. Under this definition, the very 
persons who would be most likely to claim status as an equitably adopted child are the 
very people who, absent a legal adoption, are specifically excluded from consideration as 
a child. Id; see also Utah Code Ann. §75-1-201(18) (1975)10 ("Parent" . . . excludes any 
person who is only a stepparent, foster parent, or grandparent.") 
This case illustrates the problem in applying a common law concept in the face of 
these specific statutes. While the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that 
Mr. Nakai referred to Father Hannifin as his father and Father Hannifin referred to Mr. 
Nakai as his son (Findings, R.571, |^17), the trial court also found that: 
1. Father Hannifin's obituary described Mr. Nakai as Father Hannifin's 
foster son. T.Exh. 105, Findings, R.572, «p0, 
2. His obituary identified another Native American as another foster son. Id. 
9
 Amended by Laws 1998, c. 39, § 9, eff. July 1, 1998; Laws 1999, c. 142, § 1, eff. 
May 3, 1999; Laws 2003, c. 49, § 34, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2004, c. 89, § 7, eff. July 1, 
2004; Laws 2009, c. 278, § 1, eff. May 12, 2009; Laws 2010, c. 93, § 3, eff. May 11, 
2010; this definition is now found in §75-1-201(5). 
10
 Amended by Laws 1998, c. 39, § 9, eff. July 1, 1998; Laws 1999, c. 142, § 1, 
eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2003, c. 49, § 34, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2004, c. 89, § 7, eff. 
July 1, 2004; Laws 2009, c. 278, § 1, eff. May 12, 2009; Laws 2010, c. 93, § 3, eff. May 
11, 2010; this definition is now found in §75-1-201(33). 
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and the undisputed facts further established: 
3. Mr. Nakai sent thank you notes following Father Hannifin's funeral that 
stated: "Thank you for all the kindnesses, thoughts and prayers expressed 
for my foster father William Hannifin . . . " T.Exh. 103. 
4. Mr. Nakai described himself in his initial petition to the Court as Father 
Hannifin's "foster son." T.Exh. 101 at 2, %5; R.2 f5. 
5. In 2007, Father Hannifin prepared and signed a beneficiary form identifying 
Mr. Nakai as his "foster son." T. Exh. 111. 
Given these facts and Utah's express exclusion of a foster son from inheriting a 
decedent's estate, Mr. Nakai should not be considered Father Hannifin's heir. 
Moreover, the whole equitable adoption doctrine is inconsistent with the Utah 
Uniform Probate Code's statement of its purposes: 
(1) This code shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its 
underlying purposes and policies. 
(2) The underlying purposes and policies of this code are: 
(a) To simplify and clarify the law concerning the affairs of 
decedents, missing persons, protected persons, minors, and 
incapacitated persons; 
(c) To promote a speedy and efficient system for 
administering the estate of the decedent and making 
distribution to his successors;... 
Utah Code Ann. §75-1-102; as enacted in 1975, L. 1975, ch. 150, §2. The equitable 
adoption doctrine complicates the law and requires factual determinations that cannot be 
made efficiently and speedily. 
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E. Utah Law Recognizes and Enforces Legislation that Effectively 
Overrules Prior Supreme Court Decisions. 
In two recent decisions regarding trust matters, the Supreme Court held that its 
prior decision interpreting the common law of trusts had been effectively overruled by a 
provision of the Utah Uniform Trust Code adopted in 2004. Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 
UT 68, 266 P.3d 828; see also Warne v. Warm, 2012 UT 13, _ P.3d (petition for 
rehearing denied) (companion decision issued on the S2ime date; petition for rehearing 
denied on March 1, 2012; not yet released for official publication). 
In Patterson, the trial court had invalidated an attempted amendment to a private 
trust based on the Supreme Court's decision in Banks v. Means, 2002 UT 65, 52 P.3d 
1190. Id. at \ 1. In Banks, applying the common law, the Court found that the attempted 
amendment there was void since it failed to follow the specific directions for amending 
the trust set forth in the trust agreement. Id. at [^25. In Patterson, the appellant argued 
that Banks' requirement of strict compliance with the trust provisions permitting 
amendments had been effectively overruled by the adoption of Section 75-7-605 of the 
Utah Uniform Trust Code in 2004. Utah Code Ann. §75-7-605(3) 2004 (authorizing an 
amendment based on "substantial compliance" with the provisions of the trust). The 
Supreme Court agreed with the Appellant's argument that the adoption of the Utah 
Uniform Trust Code effectively overruled Banks v. Means. Id. at f22. Thus, "It is 
axiomatic that our precedent must yield when it conflicts with a validly enacted statute." 
Mat 137. 
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In this regard, the Court in Williams' Estates cited three decisions in support of its 
adoption of the common law equitable adoption doctrine. Each of these cases has been 
effectively overruled by the enactment of the Utah Uniform Probate Code.1 ] In Williams' 
Estates, the Court stated: 
Although we have never decided this exact question we have required 
specific performance of contracts in contemplation of death, where a 
deceased person has failed to devise, transfer or convey certain property in 
accordance with an agreement for services which has been fully performed 
by the other party. 
Williams' Estates, 10 Utah 2d at 85, 348 P.2d at 684. In each case cited in Williams' 
Estates (see fn. 11 below), the Supreme Court considered the enforcement of oral 
contracts to include a person as a devisee of the decedent's will. Those decisions were 
effectively overruled by the enactment of Section 75-2-701 in 1975. Utah Code Ann. 
§75-2-701; enacted L. 1975, ch. 150, §3 (requiring contracts to make a will to be in 
writing); repealed and reenacted as §75-2-514; L. 1998, ch. 39, §57 (substantially 
identical). 
Not only does Section 75-2-701 reflect a legislative decision to choose efficiency 
over equity and justice, it also stands in stark contrast to the equitable adoption doctrine. 
While Mr. Nakai could not seek to enforce any oral promise by Father Nakai to leave him 
all or part of his estate, Mr. Nakai is able to enforce an oral promise that Father Hannifin 
11
 Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Co., 6 Utah 2d 18, 305 P.2d 480 (1956); Van 
Natta v. Heywood, 57 Utah 376, 195 P. 192 (1920); Brinton v. Van Cott, 8 Utah 480, 33 
P. 218 (1893). 
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made to adopt him. While a decedent may make an oral promise to devise property to a 
person shortly before death and in front of witnesses, the oral promise to adopt is most 
often made many, many years earlier (here fifty-four years earlier) and no witness is 
available to testify to a present recollection of what was specifically said. It is illogical to 
approve the oral promise to adopt while denying the oral promise to devise. Furthermore, 
while Section 75-2-701 fulfills the legislative purpose of "promoting] a speedy and 
efficient system for administering the estate of the decedent and making distribution to 
his successors," the court approved equitable adoption doctrine does not. Utah Code 
Ann. §75-l-102(2)(c). 
In conclusion, the enactment of the Utah Uniform Probate Code in 1975 
necessarily and effectively overruled In re Williams' Estates, and Mr. Hill asks the Court 
to so rule. 
III. THE ENACTMENT OF NEW ADOPTION LAWS AND A SUBSEQUENT 
SUPREME COURT DECISION REGARDING ADOPTION LAWS 
EFFECTIVELY OVERRULED THE EQUITABLE ADOPTION 
DOCTRINE. 
A. New Adoption Laws Have Effectively Overruled Williams' Estates. 
The equitable adoption doctrine is premised on the ability of the trial court to grant 
specific performance of a fully performed contract. Williams Estates \ 10 Utah 2d at 85, 
348 P.2d at 684-85. Utah's adoption statutes have abolished the equitable adoption 
doctrine by making any such agreement invalid. Section 78B-6-138 does so by setting the 
date a parent is relieved of parental rights and duties as the earlier of the date the court 
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orders those rights terminated or the date the court enters a legal adoption order. Utah 
Code Ann. §78B-6-138 (2008); see also §78B-6-103(2) (2010) (defining "adoption" as a 
court order); §78B-6-202(l) (2008) ("It is the intent... of the Legislature that in every 
adoption the best interest of the child should govern and be of foremost concern in the 
court's determination." Emphasis added). 
Because the equitable adoption doctrine's foundation is based on the ability of a 
court to grant specific performance of the adoption contract, the enactment of these 
statutes have eliminated the contract, the remedy, and thus the doctrine. 1-800 Contacts, 
Inc. v. Weigner, 2005 UT App 523, HI 4-10, 127 P.3d 1241. 
B. The Supreme Court Has Effectively Overruled the Equitable Adoption 
Doctrine, 
The Supreme Court overruled the equitable adoption doctrine when it ruled as a 
matter of Utah common law that parents could not relinquish their parental rights and 
responsibilities by agreement. In Hills v. Hills, 638 P.2d 516 (1981), a divorcing couple 
stipulated that the husband would relinquish all parental rights and would be relieved of 
all parental duties. Id. at 516. The trial court included the parties' agreement in its 
Divorce Decree. One month after the divorce was final, the mother brought an action to 
modify the decree to require the father to provide child support. The trial court modified 
the decree, and the father appealed. 
The Supreme Court affirmed. It stated: 
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There is no merit to the contention that the parents' stipulation effectively 
terminated the father's parental obligations. The right to support from the 
parents belongs to the minor children and is not subject to being bartered 
away, extinguished, estopped or in any way defeated by the agreement 
or conduct of the parents. Gulley v. Gulley, Utah, 570 P.2d 127 (1977); 
Baggs v. Anderson, Utah, 528 P.2d 141 (1974); French v. Johnson, 16 Utah 
2d 360, 401 P.2d 315 (1965). We cannot see how the incorporation of such 
a stipulation in a decree of the district court or the juvenile court gives it 
any greater effect. If parental rights and obligations are to be terminated, 
this must be done by court decree in the manner prescribed by law. 
Id. at 517 (emphasis added). See also Fauver v. Hansen, 803 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah App. 
1990) ("We emphasize that termination of parental rights and obligations is a serious 
procedure, which must include a hearing where the court can consider the best 
interests of the child.") (emphasis added). 
These cases preclude a parent from promising to relinquish or from attempting to 
relinquish parental rights by agreement. For the remedy of specific performance to be 
used, there must be a valid contract that is being enforced. 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. 
Weigner, 2005 UT App 523, ffi[ 4-10, 127 P.3d 1241. By preventing the contract from 
being valid in the first instance, these cases effectively preclude the remedy necessary to 
grant the relief Mr. Nakai seeks. 
IV. EVEN WERE THE DOCTRINE STILL PART OF UTAH LAW, MR. 
NAKAI HAS FAILED TO PROVE HE IS ENTITLED TO THE USE OF 
THE DOCTRINE. 
A. Mr. Nakai Failed to Prove the Specific, Foundational Facts 
Required by In re Williams' Estates. 
Pursuant to Williams' Estates, Mr. Nakai was required to prove: 
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1. There was an agreement between the putative adoptee's 
parents (Hilda Nakai and Tony Begay) and the adopting 
parent (Father Hannifin); 
2. Hilda and Tony promised to relinquish all of their rights and 
privileges as parents; 
3. Father Hannifin promised to adopt the child; 
4. Father Hannifin promised to care and provide for the child the 
same as though Mr. Nakai were his own child; and 
5. Hilda, Tony, and Father Hannifin fully performed the 
agreement except that the formal, legal adoption never 
occurred. 
Williams' Estate, supra, 10 Utah 2d at 85, 348 P.2d at 684-85. Absent proof of each of 
these elements, the doctrine of equitable adoption is not available as a remedy. 
B. Neither Mr. Nakai's Mother Nor His Grandfather Promised to 
Relinquish Parental Rights, and No Parental Rights Were 
Relinquished. 
As a legal conclusion, the trial court held that Father Hannifin, Mr. Nakai's 
mother, and Mr. Nakai's paternal grandfather reached an agreement to adopt during their 
1958 conversation based on events that occurred after the alleged conversation. Findings, 
R. 576,1f27;12 R.571-72, [^19. It did so based on dicta in Williams' Estates. After stating 
12
 Although included in the trial court's findings, the determination of whether an 
agreement existed is a conclusion of law. O'Hara v. Hall 628 P.2d 1289, 1290-91 (Utah 
1981) (existence of a contract is a conclusion of law unless there is a dispute as to a 
material fact). Here, Mr. Hill accepts the trial court's findings of fact. In addition, the 
Supreme Court is not bound by the trial court's characterization of a finding or 
conclusion. 50 West Broadway Assocs. v. Redevelopment Agency, 784 P.2d 1162, 1171 
(Utah 1989). 
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the adoptee's burden was clear and convincing evidence, the Court stated: "Some 
allowance, however, should be made for the fact that all the parties to such contract are 
dead, and the child was an infant when the contract was made." R. 575; *(j26; Williams' 
Estates, 10 Utah 2d at 85, 348 P.2d at 684-85. 
The trial court erred in applying this approach to the current case. In this case, the 
trial court had direct evidence of what occurred at the time of the alleged agreement, and 
that direct, undisputed evidence, and the trial court's finding of fact with regard to that 
evidence, bar the legal conclusion that there was an adoption contract. 
Father Hannifin did not promise to adopt Mr. Nakai. He promised to raise him as 
his own child. Findings, R.568-69, ^[11. This promise would support the legal 
conclusion that he agreed to treat Mr. Nakai as his foster son, particularly where the 
parents do not promise to relinquish their rights. Findings, R.575, Tf25.13 In order to 
establish an equitable adoption, each party must make the required promises and then 
fully perform them. Williams' Estates, 10 Utah 2d at 85, 348 P.2d at 684. Finding that 
Mr. Nakai's mother and grandfather did not promise to relinquish their parental rights 
eliminates the consideration that would support a legal conclusion that there was an 
adoption agreement. General Insurance Co. v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 502, 
13
 In Missouri, when a claimed equitable adoption is based circumstantial 
evidence, "then the evidence must be consistent only with the existence of the equitable 
adoption and inconsistent with any other reasonable hypothesis leaving nothing to 
conjecture." Bellinger v. Boatmen's Nat Bank of St. Louis, 779 S.W.2d 647, 650 (Mo. 
App. 1989). 
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504 (Utah 1976) ("Where consideration is lacking, there can be no contract.") Without a 
valid agreement, there is no foundation for applying the remedy of specific performance. 
1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Weigner, 2005 UT App 523, ffl[8-9, 127 P.3d 1241. 
Instead of ruling against Mr. Nakai, the trial court justified its decision in his favor 
by citing facts the trial court believed established "that for all practical purposes a 
relinquishment of parental rights occurred." Findings, R. ]^26.14 That the trial court's 
findings support this conclusion is questionable. It pointed to these facts: 
1. Hilda and her father asked Father Hannifin to raise Mr. Nakai as his own 
child and then gave Father Hannifin custody and control of Mr. Nakai 
several months later. 
2. Neither Hilda, Mr. Nakai's father, nor Hilda's father thereafter ever again 
sought to exercise physical custody or control over Mr. Nakai. 
3. Mr. Nakai never lived with his parents for any extended period. After the 
death of his aunt, he attended boarding schools. 
4. Because of their impoverished conditions, Mr. Nakai's parents provided 
him with virtually no support after he left the reservation. The trial court 
noted that the financial condition on the reservation appeared to be the 
primary reason for asking Father Hannifin to raise Mr. Nakai. 
Findings, R. 575, ^ 14, (a) through (e). None of these facts point exclusively to an 
agreement to adopt. They apply with equal or greater force to Father Hannifin having 
promised to act as a foster parent, who then fulfilled that role. 
14
 This "finding" was in part a legal conclusion. See footnote 12, supra. 
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The trial court found a relinquishment of all practical rights notwithstanding Mr. 
Nakai never severed his relationship with his parents. He returned to see them each 
summer. Findings, R. 571, [^18. In his initial application for probate, Mr. Nakai attached 
two pictures of his father, Tony, interacting with Father Hannifin in 2005. R.17. 
Whether or not these facts constitute a relinquishment of parental rights "for all 
practical purposes," the trial court did not find a promise to relinquish parental rights as 
required by Williams' Estates. Nor could it have done so in light of its finding that 
"Navajo parents never voluntarily relinquish their rights to their children when [an 
adoption] does occur." Findings, R.575, H25.15 
C. Mr. NakaFs Father Did Not Promise to Relinquish Parental 
Rights, and No Parental Rights were Relinquished. 
Even if there was a promise to relinquish rights for all practical purposes followed 
by a fulfillment of that promise by Mr. Nakai's mother and grandfather, the equitable 
adoption doctrine requires a promise by the natural parents to relinquish all parental 
rights. The trial court limited its finding of a relinquishment of all practical rights to Mr. 
Nakai's mother and grandfather. Findings, R.576, (^27; see also, R.568, j^lO. Rather than 
denying Mr. Nakai's claim, the trial court simply did not require any promise from Tony 
15
 Furthermore, a Utah court, applying Utah law, should apply the equitable 
adoption doctrine consistently regardless of the customs of the parties. The trial court 
granted a privileged status to Navajos that would not be available to non-Navajos. 
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nor any relinquishment, practical or otherwise. The trial court excused any proof 
regarding Tony's promises or actions because: 
1. Tony never participated actively in his son's life; 
2. Navajo custom follows a matriarchal order;16 
3. Although present during the 1958 conversation, Tony made no effort to 
participate in the conversation; 
4. Tony never objected to Mr. Nakai living with Father Hannifin; and 
5. There was no evidence Tony expected to be involved in the decision. 
Findings, R.576, p o . 
At best, these negative findings regarding Tony's conduct would constitute 
acquiescence. Smith v. Security Investment Ltd., 2009 UT App 355, ^ 5, 223 P.3d 451. 
Silence cannot constitute consent absent an affirmative duty to speak, any more than 
silence can constitute a waiver of parental rights or be a basis for estoppel of a father's 
parental rights absent that duty. See generally Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Federal Sav. & 
Loan Ass % 857 P.2d 935, 939-40 (Utah 1993). Where Mr. Nakai's father did not 
participate in the initial conversation (R.568, f^lO), never promised to relinquish his 
parental rights (R.576, [^27), continued to see his son each summer (R.571, ]fl8), and 
maintained a relationship with his son thereafter (R. 17), there was no duty to speak. 
16
 Logically, this would mean that a mother's consent to the adoption of a child 
would be unnecessary if the child were raised in a patriarchal order. 
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In essence, the trial court entered findings in support of an unstated legal 
conclusion that Navajo fathers are not required to consent to the adoption of their children 
in these circumstances. Even if that is true as a matter of Navajo custom or law, Utah law 
expressly required a father's consent to an adoption in 1958. 
Once a child is adopted its ties to its natural parents, unlike in cases 
involving mere custody, is permanently severed. Such a result, without the 
consent of the legitimate, natural parents, has not been favored by courts, it 
being considered that the natural relationship between parents and child is 
of an enduring and sacred character. Adoption proceedings are statutory and 
based on consent. 
Deveraux* Adoption v. Brown, 2 Utah 2d 30, 32, 268 P.2d 995, 996-997 (Utah 1954). 
And in order to qualify for an equitable adoption, the father must promise to relinquish all 
parental rights, and then fulfill that promise. Williams ' Estate, supra, 10 Utah 2d at 85, 
348 P.2d at 684-85. That did not occur here. 
D. The Trial Court Was Duty Bound to Follow the Williams9 Court's 
Holding; it Was Not Entitled to Modify It. 
The trial court recognized that it was not following Williams' Estates when it 
stated: "The Court does not require proof that a formal relinquishment occur, otherwise 
there would likely be a formal adoption." This justification for modifying the 
requirements of Williams' Estates cannot withstand analysis. The equitable adoption 
doctrine exists if and only if there is no formal adoption. Although recognizing the 
equitable adoption doctrine as a "narrow" exception to the statutory laws of intestacy, 
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R.578, the trial court refused to apply the requirements set forth in Williams' Estates so 
that the doctrine could be used in favor of Mr. Nakai. 
In doing so, the trial court violated the doctrine of stare decisis. 
[T]he doctrine of stare decisis, as it applies to a court of appeals, has two 
facets. Vertical stare decisis, the first of these two facets, compels a court 
to follow strictly the decisions rendered by a higher court. Under this 
mandate, lower courts are obliged to follow the holding of a higher court, as 
well as any "judicial dicta" that may be announced by the higher court. 
State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 fn 3. (Utah 1994) (emphasis added). 
Mr. Hill asks the Court to apply the equitable adoption doctrine as set forth in 
Williams' Estates to the facts of this case and reverse the trial court's conclusion that Mr. 
Nakai qualified as an equitably adopted child. 
V. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD REMAND FOR FURTHER 
PROCEEDINGS REGARDING THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF 
ATTORNEY FEES TO MR. NAKAPS ATTORNEY. 
Initially, the trial court approved Mr. Nakai's applications for attorney fees on the 
basis that he had won the case. R.579 ("Based on the result, and Mr. Nakai's status in 
this case, a fee award is warranted.") Thereafter, it entered its ruling and order approving 
the fees based on specific findings of reasonableness and pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§75-3-718. R.582-85. While this expanded the basis of the award, it remained firmly 
rooted in Mr. Nakai's right to serve as personal representative. Under Section 75-3-718, 
"[a] personal representative and an attorney are entitled to reasonable compensation for 
their services." §75-3-718(1). 
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If the Supreme Court reverses the trial court's ruling regarding Mr. Nakai's rights 
in this matter, Mr. Hill requests it remand for further proceedings the issue of attorney 
fees. One of the specific issues Mr. Hill raised below was that Mr. Nakai alleged in his 
Application for Informal Probate that he was the decedent's foster son. R.518-21. As 
such, he was not entitled to appointment. Utah Code Ann. §75-3-203(1) (1983). When 
his appointment was challenged by Reverend Canon Caryl Marsh, the trial court 
considered his appointment based on whether there had been a showing of irreparable 
harm. R.196. Finding there was no irreparable harm, the trial court continued Mr. 
Nakai's appointment "for the sole purpose of gathering assets and paying outstanding 
bills of the estate." R.197, ^1 . Neither Mr. Hill acting for the collateral heirs nor the 
collateral heirs themselves were parties to that proceeding. It is only because the trial 
court allowed Mr. Nakai to continue to serve as personal representative, prior to 
adjudicating his rights as an equitably adopted son, that Mr. Nakai was able to claim 
attorney fees in the first place. R.393-405 (first application for attorney fees filed March 
4,2011). 
Therefore, if there is a reversal, the trial court should at least reconsider its ruling 
on attorney fees in light of the fact that Mr. Nakai had no claim to act as the personal 
representative either initially or eventually. Since the trial court awarded attorney fees 
based on Mr. Nakai's status as a personal representative, the trial court should reconsider 
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its ruling in light of the Supreme Court's reversal and the fact Mr. Nakai was never 
entitled to act as a personal representative. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on these arguments, the Supreme Court should reverse the trial court, order 
it to enter judgment in favor of Max Hill as special administrator of the estate on behalf of 
the collateral heirs, order it to appoint Max Hill general personal representative of the 
estate, remand for reconsideration of the attorney fee award, and direct it otherwise to 
administer the estate pursuant to provisions of the Utah Uniform Probate Code. 
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FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUL 2 ? 2011 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF : FINDINGS OF FACT, 
WILLIAM J. HANNIFIN, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
: RULING AND ORDER 
Deceased. 
: CASE NO. 103900808 
Judge Robert K. Hilder 
The Petition of Willis Nakai, which seeks to establish that he is 
the equitably adopted son of William Hannifin and therefore an heir to 
Mr. Hannifin's estate, was tried to the Court on July 21, 2011. Donald 
J. Winder represented Willis Nakai; and Charles M. Bennett represented 
Max Hill, Special Administrator of the Estate. After considering the 
testimony of the several witnesses, the exhibits, trial briefs, 
argument of counsel and being fully advised in the applicable law, the 
Court now enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1 The deceased, William J. Hannifin, was born August 3, 1930. 
Mr. Hannifin, who became a Deacon in the Episcopal Church in 1954 and 
a Priest in 1955, lived his entire adult life serving his church. He 
was never married and had no biological children. 
2 Willis Nakai, born May 13, 1944, is a member of the Navajo 
Tribe. 
-1-
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3 Mr. Hannifin spent much of his life in communication with 
and often in proximity, to Native American people, including many 
Navajo people. Although there is some confusion in precise dates, it 
appears that Mr. Hannifin (who was then known as "Father Hannifin") 
first met Mr. Nakai around 1956, when he was 12-years-old and enrolled 
in the Intermountain Indian School in Brigham City, Utah. 
4 Mr. Nakai was born to Hilda Handy Nakai and Tony Nakai 
Begay, who remained married until Hilda's death. 
5 For reasons that were neither clear nor particularly 
relevant to this matter, Mr. Nakai was raised from infancy by his 
childless aunt, Bessie Begay, near Aneth, Utah. Unfortunately, Ms. 
Begay was killed by lightning when Mr. Nakai was about 5 or 6-years-
old. It is probably true that, thereafter, Mr. Nakai was deemed to be 
in the custody of his mother and maternal grandparents, but in fact, 
after the death of his aunt, Mr. Nakai was sent to a series of 
boarding schools, including the Intermountain Indian School. 
6 In fact, Mr. Nakai spent very little time actually residing 
with either his parents or his grandparents. 
7 Through his work in Brigham City, Father Hannifin became 
involved with Navajo children and in the summer of 1958, he drove to 
the Navajo Reservation near Aneth, Utah, to transport several children 
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to attend Camp Tuttie, a youth camp sponsored by the Episcopal Church. 
Mr. Nakai was among these children. 
8 At the time of this visit in 1958, Mr. Nakai was living with 
his mother and/or maternal grandparents. Mr. Nakai's father was not 
very involved in the family. He worked for the railroad and was 
frequently away from home. 
9 At the time of the 1958 visit, despite difficulties 
understanding their respective primary languages, a conversation 
occurred between Father Hannifin, Mr. Nakai's mother and his maternal 
grandfather. Mr. Nakai recalls being present but he does not recall 
the conversation. Mr. Nakai knows the family account of what happened 
from family stories, which Father Hannifin, his mother and his 
grandfather recited to him over the years. 
10 There is no evidence that Mr. Begay was a party to any of 
the 1958 discussions, which formed the alleged contractual basis for 
Mr. Nakai's equitable adoption claim. 
11 The gist of the conversation, as shown by the evidence and 
as passed down orally over the decades, is that Mr. Nakai's mother 
asked Father Hannifin to take her then 14-year-old son and raise him 
as his own child. The evidence is uncontradicted that Father Hannifin 
responded uNo, unless you take me as one of your children, as one of 
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your relatives, that's the only way I'm going to take your son." 
Family lore recounts that the grandfather then jokingly offered "to 
sell him to [Father Hannifin] for fifty cents." 
12 The joke notwithstanding, the Court finds that there is 
clear and convincing evidence that the oft-restated essentials of this 
1958 conversation, along with the substantial evidence of performance 
of the agreement, constituted an agreement for Father Hannifin to step 
in and raise Mr. Nakai as his own son. 
13 For reasons that did not become clear at trial and despite 
the fact that Mr. Nakai had apparently attended the Intermountain 
Indian School for one or two prior years, following the events of the 
summer of 1958, Mr. Nakai attended school near the Reservation and did 
not immediately transition to the custody of Father Hannifin. 
14 At some point during the school year, Mr. Nakai returned to 
the Intermountain Indian School. Part of the reason was apparently 
that there was a law in effect that if Native American parents did not 
ensure the child was in school, they were subject to incarceration. In 
any event, Mr. Nakai moved to the Intermountain Indian School and 
Father Hannifin commenced his lifelong involvement with him in what 
the Court finds was a clearly a parental role. The only question to be 
determined herein is whether the role was as adoptive parent, with 
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full rights of parentage, rather than as a foster parent, in loco 
parentis or another quasi parent-child relationship. 
15 It could be said that the relationship evolved because Mr. 
Nakai was initially a boarding student at the school, spending only 
his weekends and holidays in Father Hannifin's home. That of course is 
not an unusual arrangement for students in boarding school. In fact, 
it is not unusual for boarding school students to visit with their 
parents only once or twice per school term, or even just for holidays. 
In any event, as the years passed and as Mr. Nakai developed some 
health problems, he moved into Father Hannifin's home, which became 
his full-time home during the remainder of his secondary education and 
throughout his college education, when he commuted to Utah State 
University. 
16 Commencing with Mr. Nakai's return to Brigham City after the 
summer of 195 8, Father Hannifin consistently provided emotional and 
material support as a father would for a son. The Court finds that Mr. 
Nakai's school expenses were paid through a Bureau of Indian Affairs 
program, but throughout all the remaining years of Mr. Nakai's 
minority and even subsequently, Father Hannifin provided an allowance, 
food, clothing, medical care as necessary and transportation. Father 
Hannifin also taught Mr. Nakai to drive, monitored his schoolwork, 
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made all decisions regarding activities in which Mr. Nakai 
participated and generally provided for his health and welfare. 
17 From the time that Mr. Nakai returned to the Intermoimtain 
Indian School and commenced his life with Father Hannifin, he referred 
to Father Hannifin as his father, or Mad" and Father Hannifin 
referred to Mr. Nakai as his son. 
18 Also from the time Mr. Nakai returned to the school, he 
never again lived with either his parents or grandparents. The 
evidence is unrefuted that Mr. Nakai visited the Reservation and his 
biological family no more than once each year and visits lasted a few 
days to at most two weeks, but were typically for a week. 
19 The evidence is clear and convincing that at all times 
following Mr.. Nakai's return to Brigham City after the summer of 1958, 
both he and Father Hannifin held themselves out to the community and 
to family as father and son. Over the many following years, Father 
Hannifin assumed the role of and actively participated as a father to 
Mr. Nakai and later as a grandfather to Mr. Nakai' children. The 
record is replete with evidence that Father Hannifin was involved with 
Mr. Nakai and his family as a respected father, grandfather and even 
great grandfather. Mr. Nakai continued to seek counsel from Father 
Hannifin as a parent and Father Hannifin gave that counsel over the 
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decades. 
2 0 The Court recognizes that there is a lack of evidence of 
formal recognition of the father-son relationship. There is no 
adoption decree, for example, and the obituary of Father Hannifin 
refers to Mr. Nakai Nakai as a "foster son" and also recognizes a 
second foster son. The other son was neither a party to this action 
nor represented at trial, and the Court heard very little evidence 
regarding his relationship with Father Hannifin. Under the 
circumstances, the Court finds that the absence of evidence supporting 
a father-son relationship with another "child" is not determinative of 
the relationship between Mr. Nakai and Father Hannifin. Nor is there 
evidence to support any comparison between these relationships that 
bears on the Court's findings. 
21 The Court can and does determine that Mr. Nakai and Father 
Hannifin saw themselves as living in a father and son relationship and 
Father Hannifin assumed all of the duties and responsibilities of a 
parent. The thornier question is whether the relationship that 
practically demonstrated a father-son bond was sufficient to support a 
determination of an adoptive relationship that satisfies the equitable 
adoption doctrine. 
22 There is substantial case law on equitable adoption in other 
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states, but all parties agree the primary authority for Utah's 
equitable adoption doctrine is the case of In re: Estate of Williams, 
348 P.2d 683 (Utah 1960). 
23 The foregoing Findings of Fact demonstrate the Court's 
determination that Father Hannifin, as putative adoptive father, 
agreed to adopt Mr. Nakai and to care and provide for him the same as 
though he were Father Hannifin's child. A remaining issue of full 
performance of the agreement by all parties, is also established in 
the foregoing findings as they relate to Father Hannifin's actions 
over many years. 
24 The facts that bear on whether the parents agreed to 
relinquish all their rights to the child to Father Hannifin, are: 
(a) Mr. Nakai's biological mother and maternal grandfather 
agreed to give custody and control of Mr. Nakai to Father Hannifin and 
asked him to raise Mr. Nakai as his own child. 
(b) Mr. Nakai's biological mother and maternal grandfather 
sent Mr. Nakai into Father Hannifin's permanent care just a few months 
after making the agreement to adopt. 
(c) Neither Mr. Nakai's biological mother, biological 
father, nor his maternal grandparents, ever again sought to exercise 
physical custody or control over Mr. Nakai. No effort was ever made to 
-8-
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return Mr. Nakai to their custody and control. This is true even 
though Mr. Nakai's biological parents remained married until his 
mother's death, when Mr. Nakai was a mature adult. 
(d) Without imputing any lack of commitment to Mr. Nakai 
by his biological parents, the Court notes the unrebutted fact that 
except for a very short time in his life, Mr. Nakai never lived with 
his biological parents for any extended period. In fact, from his 
earliest infancy he was with his aunt. Following her death, he was 
sent to boarding school. He was nominally in the custody of his mother 
and father and perhaps his maternal grandparents, but for most of his 
life, except for a short time after the summer of 1958, Mr. Nakai was 
not in the custody of his biological family, except for the early 
years with his aunt. 
(e) After physical relinquishment of custody to Father 
Hannifin, Mr. Nakai's biological parents provided him with virtually 
no support. In fact, the only evidence of any material support was Mr. 
Nakai's testimony that his family gave him $.25 or $.50 when he left 
home, which was meant to last a year. Again, this finding of fact is 
not intended to suggest any lack of care or concern by the biological 
parents. The testimony also establishes that the Nakai family were of 
very limited financial means. In fact, it appears that one of the 
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primary reasons they asked Father Hannifin to take their son was a 
lack of financial ability to raise him. 
25 The Court has struggled with the legal requirement that Mr. 
Nakai's biological parents must agree to relinquish all their rights 
to the child to establish an equitable adoption, and the fact that 
there was no formal relinquishment here. However, the evidence shows 
that in the Navajo tradition, adoption is not uncommon within Navajo 
families, but Navajo parents never voluntarily relinquish their rights 
to their children when it does occur. 
26 The Court further finds that in the context of a petition to 
establish an equitable adoption, the agreement to give a child to 
another, accomplished by the physical act of doing so along with the 
parents' forbearance from ever seeking to regain custody, shows, by 
clear and convincing evidence, that for all practical purposes a 
relinquishment of parental rights occurred. The Court finds this to be 
particularly true when there must be clear and convincing evidence of 
a contract to adopt, but usome allowance, however, should be made for 
the fact that: all the parties to such contract are dead, and the child 
was an infant when the contract was made." Williams, at 684-85. The 
Court does not require proof that a formal relinquishment occur, 
otherwise there would likely be a formal adoption. 
-10-
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27 It is the Court's finding that Mr. Nakai's biological mother 
and maternal grandfather agreed to relinquish all practical parental 
rights to Mr. Nakai, but they did so in the context of an ancient 
tradition that caused them to not even consider relinquishment as it 
is more formally defined in statutory adoption law. The events also 
occurred sixty years before the death of Father Hannifin and there was 
no evidence or even a suggestion that he ever reneged his agreement. 
28 The Court finds the clear and convincing evidence shows a 
relinquishment occurred, under these circumstances. 
29 Father Hannifin and Mr. Nakai both fully performed their 
parts of the agreement to be father and son. 
30 The Court also recognizes that nothing herein shows an 
affirmative act to relinquish all of Tony Begay's rights to Mr. Nakai. 
In fact, the record shows Tony Begay never participated actively in 
his son's life and although he was present on the property at the time 
the discussion occurred, he made no effort to take part and he never 
objected to the placement of Mr. Nakai was Father Hannifin. The 
evidence supports the view that Tony Begay's conduct was consistent 
with the Navajo custom of a matriarchal structure, and determination 
of clan structure through maternal bloodlines. No evidence suggests 
Mr. Begay expected to be more active in the placement decision. 
-11-
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31 Based on the evidence, the Court finds that although there 
are numerous ways to define a parent-child relationship, which 
definitions are normally at issue when the custody of the child is of 
concern, not all of these arrangements are true parent-child 
relationships. However, the clear and convincing evidence shows the 
sixty-year relationship and bonds between Father Hannifin and Mr. 
Nakai were consistent in all respects with the formation of and 
performance of an adoption contract by all parties thereto. 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and 
enters its following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Equitable adoption has a narrow place in law and is not a legal 
doctrine that is universally-recognized nor applied. The Utah Supreme 
Court has however, indicated support for applying the doctrine under 
Utah law. See Williams, supra. In Williams, the Court noted: 
It is generally recognized that where a child's parents 
agree with the adoptive parents to relinquish all their 
rights to the child in consideration of the adoptive 
parents' agreement to adopt such child, and to care and 
provide for it the same as though it were their own child, 
and such agreement is fully performed by all parties 
connected with such contract except there is no actual 
adoption, the courts will decree specific performance of 
such contract and thereby award to the child the same 
distributive share of the adoptive parents' estate as it 
would have been entitled to had the child actually been 
adopted as agreed. 
-12-
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Id, 684 (citations omitted). The Williams Court also recognized that 
w
 [a] contract to adopt the [child] . . . may be proved by 
circumstantial evidence, but such evidence must be clear and 
convincing. Some allowance, however, should be made for the fact that 
all the parties to such contract are dead, and the child was an infant 
when the contract was made. Id. 684-85. 
Based on the language of Williams, the Court concludes that the 
doctrine of equitable adoption can be applied under narrow 
circumstances in Utah, where the clear and convincing evidence shows 
an agreement to adopt and performance thereof. 
The Court concludes that based on the clear and convincing 
evidence set forth in the trial of this matter, there was an agreement 
that Father Hannifin would adopt Mr. Nakai as his son and Mr. Nakai's 
biological family agreed to relinquish all rights to Mr. Nakai in 
return. That agreement was never rescinded by Mr. Nakai's biological 
parents or family. 
The evidence supporting performance of the parent-child 
relationship between Mr. Hannifin and Mr. Nakai is abundant. That 
evidence makes manifest that Mr. Hannifin assumed the duties and 
responsibilities of a parent to Mr. Nakai, who in return was, for all 
intents and purposes, his son. The only formal element lacking from 
-13-
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this relationship is a legal decree of adoption. 
Based on the clear and convincing evidence, the Court concludes, 
that the contract to adopt was agreed to, performed and that the 
resulting equitable adoption of Mr. Nakai by Father Hannifin entitles 
Mr. Nakai to inherit from Father Hannifin's estate as though he were 
his legally adopted son. Mr. Nakai shall be entitled to the same 
portion of Mr. Hannifin's estate that he would have been entitled to 
had he actually been legally adopted as agreed. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
There is only one fee claim before the Court at this time as far 
as the Court can ascertain. Max Hill, Special Administrator, was 
represented by Mr. Charles Bennett pursuant to a contingency fee 
agreement. He was very well represented, but in light of the outcome 
in Mr. Nakai's favor, no fee is owing to Mr. Bennett. 
Mr. Winder reserved the right to submit an updated fee claim for 
Mr. Nakai. Based on the result, and Mr. Nakai's status in this case, a 
fee award is warranted. The court will await the updated fee claim, 
but Mr. Winder is advised that if it is not received by Friday July 
29, 2 011-and preferably Thursday-the assigned judge may not have a 
chance to rule on reasonableness before his retirement. Should that 
occur, the matter will be submitted to the successor court, the 
-14-
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Honorable Royal I. Hansen. 
Mr. Winder is invited to submit any additional Order he deems 
necessary to finalize this matter. 
Dated this .day of July, 2011. 
By the Court: 
RotfeTr/ K. H i l d e i
 r ^«,^ . 
D i s t r i c t Court J u W ' ^ ^ S l l 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, to the following, 
this day of July, 2011: 
Donald J. Winder 
Lance F. Sorenson 
Attorneys for Applicant Willis Nakai 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000 
P.O. Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668 
Charles M. Bennett 
Attorney for Max Hill, Special 
Administrator of the Estate 
257 East 200 South, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
jfos*02*2. 
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8 « W aALrUK£COUWTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF : RULING AND ORDER 
WILLIAM J. HANNIFIN, Attorney Fees 
Deceased. 
CASE NO. 103900808 
Judge Robert K. Hilder 
This Ruling and Order supplements the Court's Findings, etc., 
issued July 27, 2011. The sole remaining issue is Mr. Nakai's first 
and supplemental fee applications. Mr. Nakai is not seeking fees 
incurred in conjunction with the dispute between him and the other 
heirs. His counsel now informs the Court that Mr. Nakai will not 
supplement his application through the trial date. Accordingly, the 
Court may now rule. 
The Court must determine reasonableness and necessity of fees. To 
determine a reasonable award of attorney fees and costs the Court 
considers the following factors: 
1. What legal work was actually performed? 
2. How much of the work performed was reasonably 
necessary to adequately prosecute the matter? 
3. Is the attorney's billing rate consistent with 
the rates customarily charged in the locality for 
similar services? 
4. Are there circumstances which require 
consideration of additional factors, including 
-1-
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those listed in the Code of Professional 
Responsibility? 
Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 990 (citations omitted). The Court 
briefly addresses all factors in the following narrative. 
First, the work done is clearly explained, and nothing in the 
record before the Court suggests that work was done that was 
inappropriate in any way. In this rather unusual circumstance-one 
brought about through no fault of any party to the case-the personal 
representative's counsel have done what was needed. They have not done 
more than was necessary. Second, the Winder & Counsel billing rates 
are eminently fair/ even low considering the experience and ability of 
the lawyers who have worked on this case. Third, the outcome 
vindicates the personal representative's litigation and administration 
decisions. 
The Court notes that some costs would not necessarily pass muster 
as taxable costs under Rule 54(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
case law, but the rule does not control the outcome in this case. The 
question is whether the costs-or expenses-were necessary and 
appropriate. The Court finds that they are. 
Based on the two applications on file, and the foregoing Ruling, 
the Court now ORDERS: 
1. That compensation is awarded for professional services 
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rendered by Winder & Counsel m the total amount of 
$15,181.00 (fees) and $1,051.33 (expenses), for a total 
award of $16,232.33. 
2. That the estate be authorized pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
75-3-718 to pay said amounts from the funds presently held 
by the Estate. 
Dated this 30th day of July, 2011. 
By the Court: 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing F±nri«*gs--«^  to the following, 
this 1 day of Jy&f, 2011: 
Donald J. Winder 
Lance F. Sorenson 
Attorneys for Applicant Willis Nakai 
175 West 200.South, Suite 4000 
P.O. Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668 
Charles M. Bennett 
Attorney for.t Max Hill, Special 
Administrator of the Estate 
257 East 200 South, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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